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Abstract—A new computational private information retrieval
(PIR) scheme based on random linear codes is presented. A
matrix of messages from a McEliece scheme is used to query the
server with carefully chosen errors. The server responds with the
sum of the scalar multiple of the rows of the query matrix and
the files. The user recovers the desired file by erasure decoding
the response. Contrary to code-based cryptographic systems, the
scheme presented here enables to use truly random codes, not
only codes disguised as such. Further, we show the relation to the
so-called error subspace search problem and quotient error search
problem, which we assume to be difficult, and show that the
scheme is secure against attacks based on solving these problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private information retrieval (PIR) was first introduced
in [1], enabling a user to retrieve a data item from a database
without revealing the identity of the retrieved item to the
system owner. A trivial solution would be to download the
whole database, which is also the possibility to achieve in-
formation theoretic privacy with a single server. This solution
is infeasible for modern storage systems that can contain a
huge number of potentially big files. One possible solution
to achieve better retrieval rates is to replicate the files on
several non-colluding servers, allowing for information the-
oretic privacy, see, e.g., [2], [3] for early works and [4],
[5], [6], [7] for more recent literature1. While this allows for
schemes of higher rate and lower computational complexity,
the assumption of no collusion between some or all of the
servers is regarded as unpractical in many use cases.
Schemes for single-server computational PIR have been
presented in [8], [9], [10], relying on “pre-quantum” cryp-
tographic paradigms, i.e., on paradigms that will be rendered
insecure once a sufficiently powerful quantum computer exists.
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1Note that in the earlier works, the PIR rate (or its inverse) is referred to as
communication complexity, and takes into account both upload and download
cost. More recent works typically ignore the upload cost, assuming that the
query size is negligible compared to the file size.
The practicality of the existing computational PIR schemes
was discussed in [11], concluding that in a realistic setting,
the execution of these schemes would take more time than
the trivial solution of downloading the whole database due to
the computational complexity on the server side. Following
this discussion, further effort has been made in finding com-
putational PIR schemes with lower computational complexity.
A computationally efficient lattice-based computational PIR
scheme was proposed in [12], which can plausibly be executed
in less time than the trivial solution. A practical attack to this
scheme for databases with a small number of elements was
found in [13]. However, this is not a very big drawback, as
modern databases and storage systems tend to contain a large
number of files.
In [14], the first fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
scheme was constructed using lattice-based cryptography. Fol-
lowing this breakthrough, [15] gave a general construction
from a FHE scheme to PIR. Furthermore, they give an instance
of this construction which is practical and outperforms the
scheme in [12]. Other PIR schemes based on homomorphic
encryption were proposed recently in [16], [17], [18], [19].
Building on the protocol of [17], a method to significantly
decrease the query size was introduced in [20].
This paper is the first to provide a computational PIR
scheme based on codes, and can be seen as a counter-part to
the lattice-based scheme of [12] along the same lines as code-
based and lattice-based cryptography are connected in general.
The query to the sever can be considered as a matrix whose
rows contain corrupted codewords of a secret code. The server
then responds with the scalar product of the query matrix and
the files and the user can recover the requested file by erasure
decoding. Depending on the parameters, the achieved PIR rates
are comparable to the existing computational PIR schemes
of [15], [12]. The complexity, which is the bottleneck of
current computational schemes, benefits from all calculations
being over binary extension fields, which is advantageous for
implementation.
Remark 1. This computational PIR scheme has recently been
broken for all relevant parameters. For details see [21].
II. NOTATION
Let Fq denote the finite field of order q and Fqs its extension
field of extension degree s. We write [a, b] for the set {a, a+
1, ..., b} and if a = 1 we write [b]. We denote a linear code C
X = X1 X2 X3 · · · Xm L
(s− v)(n− k)
Fig. 1. Illustration of file matrix X .
over Fq of length n and dimension k by [n, k]q. Let G be a
generator matrix of C. We say a set I ⊆ [n] with |I| ≥ k is an
information set of the code if rk(G|I) = k, whereG|I denotes
the restriction of the matrix G to the columns in indexes by I.
III. PRELIMINARIES
We begin by defining some basic functions required for the
description of the PIR scheme.
Definition 1. Let E ⊆ [n] and E ∈ Fξ×|E|. Denote by ME
the n×n identity matrix with all rows index by [n]\E deleted.
The map φ(E, E) is given by φn(E, E) = E ·ME .
For example, consider the mapping
φn (( 1 23 4 ) , {2, 4}) = (
1 2
3 4 ) · (
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
identity matrix rows 1 and 3 deleted
= ( 0 1 0 30 2 0 4 ) .
In the following we need to be able to “cut" out the part of
an element contained in a certain subspace.
Definition 2. Let Γ = {γ1, γ2, ..., γs} be a basis of Fqs over
Fq and α be an element α ∈ Fqs with α =
∑s
j=1 αjγj , αi ∈
Fq . For a subspace W with basis W such that W ⊂ Γ we
define
ψWΓ (α) =
∑
γj∈W
αjγj .
Note that for any element α ∈W of a subspace of Fqs and
element α′ ∈ Fqs/W of the quotient space it holds that
ψWΓ (βα+ β
′α′) = βα ∀ β, β′ ∈ Fq .
IV. A CODE-BASED COMPUTATIONAL PIR SCHEME
In a computational PIR scheme, a user generates a query
Qi from a set of secret information S and a set of public
information P . For each such query the server replies with
some Ai, which is a function of the received query Qi,
the m files X1, ..., Xm stored on the server, and the public
information P . The scheme is said to be correct if the user
can recover the desired file from the replies of the servers.
A. System Model
We consider a single server storing m files, i.e., in total
we store X ∈ F
L×m(s−v)(n−k)
q , where each file X l ∈
F
L(s−v)(n−k)
q is given by a submatrix of (s−v)(n−k) columns
(compare Figure 1). We denote δ := (s−v)(n−k), this param-
eter can be considered the required level of subpacketization.
We assume that the indices of the files are known to the user.
B. Query
The user chooses a random [n, k]qs code C. LetD ∈ F
mδ×n
qs
be a matrix where each rowDl,: is chosen uniformly at random
from C. Let I ⊂ [n] with |I| = k be a randomly chosen
information set of C and denote its complement by E = [n]\I.
Further, the user chooses a random basis Γ = {γ1, γ2, ..., γs}
Qi = D +
n
+E
m
(s
−
v
)(n
−
k
)
∆
∆⊗ emi
Fig. 2. Illustration of query matrix Qi.
of Fqs over Fq. We denote by V the Fq-linear subspace of Fqs
of dimension v spanned by V = {γ1, ..., γv}, where v < s,
and by W be the s − v dimensional subspace spanned by
W = {γv+1, ..., γs}, i.e., the quotient space Fqs/V . The user
chooses a matrix Eˆ ∈ V mδ×n−k i.i.d. at random. We denote
E = φn(Eˆ, E).
Let ∆̂ ∈ W (s−v)(n−k)×n−k be chosen i.i.d. random from
matrices of full row-rank over Fq , i.e., with rkq(∆̂) = (s −
v)(n− k), and denote ∆ = φ(∆̂, E).
The query for file X i is given by
Qi = D + E +∆⊗ emi , (1)
where emi ∈ F
m×1
2 denotes the i-th unit vector and ⊗ denotes
the Kronecker product. An illustration of the query matrix Qi
is given in Figure 2.
C. Response
The server receives the query Qi ∈ Fm×nqs and responds
with
Ai = X ·Qi ∈ FL×nqs , (2)
i.e., with a matrix where each row is an Fq-linear combination
of the rows of Qi with coefficients given by the respective row
of X .
D. Decoding
Denote the j-th unit vector of length n by enj . The user
receives a matrix where the z-th row is given by
Aiz,: = Xz,: ·Q
i
=
(
m∑
l=1
X lz,: · (D(l−1)δ+1:lδ,: + E(l−1)δ+1:lδ,:)
)
+X iz,: ·∆
=
(
m∑
l=1
X lz,: ·D(l−1)δ+1:lδ,:
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈C
+
(
m∑
l=1
X lz,: · E(l−1)δ+1:lδ,:
)
+X iz,: ·∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
zero in positions [n]\E
.
As the positions [n]\E are an information set of C by definition
and the set E is known to the user, the entire vector
∑m
l=1X
l
z,:·
D(l−1)δ+1:lδ,: can be recovered and thereby
Aiz,: −
(
m∑
l=1
X lz,: ·D(l−1)δ+1:lδ,:
)
=
(
m∑
l=1
X lz,: · E(l−1)δ+1:lδ,:
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈V 1×n
+X iz,: ·∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈W 1×n
.
Applying the function from Definition 2 with respect to W
yields
ψWΓ
((
m∑
l=1
X lz,: · E(l−1)δ+1:lδ,:
)
+X iz,: ·∆
)
= X iz,: ·∆ .
As ∆ˆ is of full row-rank over Fq , so is ∆. Hence, the
vector X iz,: can be recovered and finally the entire file X
i
by performing these steps on each row z ∈ [L].
E. Analysis
The upload, i.e., the size of the query, in bits is
H(Qi) = mδn log2(q
s) = mδns log2(q).
The download, i.e., the size of the response, in bits is
H(Ai) = Ln log2(q
s) = Lns log2(q).
Theorem 1. The rate of the scheme is given by
RPIR =
Lδ log2(q)
mδns log2(q) + Lns log2(q)
=
L
mδ + L
(
1−
k + v
s
(n− k)
n
)
.
A common assumption in literature is that the size of the
file is much larger than the number of files, i.e., L >> δm.
In this case it is reasonable to neglect the upload cost in the
calculation of the rate of the scheme.
Corollary 1 (PIR Rate). For L >> δm, the rate of the scheme
is
RPIR ≈ 1−
k + v
s
(n− k)
n
.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Subspace Attack
The security of the system is based on the idea that it is
difficult for the attacker to differentiate which rows of D, i.e.,
elements of C, are corrupted by elements from a different
subspace than the other rows (indicated by the green columns
of ∆ in Figure 2).
The security of our system is therefore tightly related to the
following search problem.
Problem 1 (Error Subspace Search Problem). Given a set
of words in Fnqs which are each the sum of a codeword of
a random code C and an error vector. Find a v-dimensional
subspace that contains the largest possible number of these
error vectors.
Solving this general problem efficiently would break our
system. Since the code of our system is unknown, it appears
as a random code to an attacker. It is known that decoding
a random code (i.e., explicitly finding the error vector(s)) is
an NP hard problem. Problem 1 is easier than decoding as
we do not want to decode all words (or many), but find the
v-dimensional subspace that contains the most error vectors.
However, we are not aware of how to find this subspace other
than just trying all v-dimensional subspaces which results in
an exponential complexity. Once this v-dimensional subspace
is known, an approach to break our system is derived in the
following.
The rows of the matrix QT are considered as the basis
of a code. As the rows of D are random elements of a k-
dimensional vector space, another basis of this code is given
by 〈
QT
〉
=
〈(
D ·A, Eˆ + ∆ˆ⊗ emi
)T〉
,
for some full-rank matrix A ∈ Fn×k. Recall that the elements
of Eˆ are from the space V and the elements of ∆ˆ are from the
quotient spaceW . It follows that all elements in (Eˆ+∆ˆ⊗emi )
T
are from V , except for the ones corresponding to file i, which
can be from the entire field Fqs . Therefore, if the attacker is
able to find such a basis, the index of the desired file can
easily be determined. Hence we can restate the problem as:
find a subspace of
〈
QT
〉
such that all positions except for those
corresponding to one file are from a subspace of dimension
dim(V ) = v.
Once a suitable subspace V is known (or for any guessed
subspace), an attacker can proceed by the following procedure:
1) Consider the [mδ, n] code spanned by QT . Puncture the
positions belonging to the file l.
2) Calculate a parity-check matrix of this code. This matrix
spans the dual code of dimension (m− 1)δ − n.
3) Extend the parity-check matrix to the subfield. If every-
thing is random, the dimension of the subfield subcode is
max{(m−1)δ−((m−1)δ−n)s, 0} w.h.p. As m >> n,
this is almost certainly 0.
4) If the dimension of the subcode is zero, then l 6= i. If it
is non-zero, then l = i w.h.p.
This attack is successful w.h.p. for all parameters that lead
to a reasonable rate. However, it requires that the attacker
knows that subspace V in order to determine the dimension of
the corresponding subcode. Hence, to prevent this attack, the
system parameters need to be chosen such that the probability
of the attacker guessing the correct subspace is small.
The number of v-dimensional subspaces of an s-
dimensional space (where v ≤ s) is given by the Gaussian
binomial coefficient, i.e.,[
s
v
]
q
=
(1 − qs)(1 − qs−1)...(1 − qs−v+1)
(1− qv)(1− qv−1)...(1− q)
.
Instead of guessing the actual v-dimensional subspace V ,
the attacker can also guess a larger subspace in the hope that
it contains the correct space V , as any subspace subcode can
be expected to be empty if the number of files m is large
(the probability approaches 1 as m → ∞). The probability
of picking a space containing V depends on the number
of possible extensions spaces, i.e., the number of higher
dimensional subspaces a smaller subspace is contained in.
Lemma 1. Every v-dimensional subspace of Fqs is a sub-
space of [
s− v
z − v
]
q
subspaces of dimension z.
Proof: Let V be any v-dimensional subspace of Fqs and
Z be a z-dimensional subspace containing it. Then there is a
one-to-one mapping between the Z and the z−v-dimensional
subspaces of the quotient space Fqs/V .
The attack is successful if the attacker picks one of these
(s− 1)-dimensional “superspaces”, which happens with prob-
ability
Pr{V ⊆ Z} =
[
s− v
s− 1− v
]
q︸ ︷︷ ︸
# of (s − 1)-dim.
extension spaces
·
[
s
s− 1
]−1
q︸ ︷︷ ︸
inverse of # of
(s− 1)-dim. spaces
,
if the space Z is chosen uniformly at random. To prevent the
attack, we require the inverse of this probability to be larger
than the security level of the scheme.
B. Linear Dependency Attack
The goal of the attacker is to determine for which l ∈ [m]
the corresponding rows in Q differ from the other rows. In this
section, we discuss an attack that aims at directly finding the
file index i by comparing the probability of rows of the query
matrix being independent, given that positions corresponding
to l are included or not. We can therefore say that if one can
efficiently solve the following problem, our system would be
broken.
Problem 2 (Quotient Error Search Problem). Given a set of
words in Fnqs which are each the sum of a codeword of a
random code C and an error vector from a subspace Fnqv ,
except for one, to which an additional error vector from the
quotient space Fnqs/F
n
qv is added. Find the word with the
additional error vector from the quotient space.
We analyze the probability of a square submatrix of Q being
of full rank if it does not contain any rows corresponding to
the i-th file. This probability differs from the probability for
a submatrix containing rows corresponding to the i-th file, as
the probability of a matrix being full-rank decreases with the
size of the subspace. For simplicity we only consider the case
where Fqv is a subfield of Fqs and leave the generalization to
arbitrary subspaces for an extended version of this work.
Theorem 2. Let v|s. Then for any I ⊂ [mδ] \ {(i − 1)δ +
1, ..., iδ} with |S| = n it holds that
Pr{rkqs(DI,: + EI,:) = n} ≥
 n∏
j=n−k+1
1−
1
qsj

·
n−k∏
j=1
(
1−
1
qsj
)
−
1− n∏
j=k+1
(
1−
1
qsj
)
Proof: Without loss of generality assume that E = [n −
k]. By slight abuse of notation we drop the index I in the
following, i.e., instead of DI,: and EI,: we simply write D
and E.
Let B ∈ Fn×nqs be chosen uniformly at random from all
full-rank matrices with
B · (D + E) =
(
B1
B2
)
·
((
D1,1 D1,2
D2,1 D2,2
)
+
(
Eˆ1 0k×k
Eˆ2 0n−k×k
))
=
(
D′
1
D′
2
0n−k×n−k 0n−k×k
)
+
(
Eˆ′
1
0k×k
Eˆ′
2
0n−k×k
)
. (3)
Note that such a matrix always exists since the rows of D are
taken from a k-dimensional subspace and E is only supported
on E .
The matrix B · (D + E) is of full rank if and only if D′2
and Eˆ′2 are of full rank, therefore
Pr{rk(D + E) = n} = Pr{rk(D′2) = k ∧ rk(E
′
2) = n− k}
= Pr{rk(D′2) = k} · Pr{rk(E
′
2) = n− k| rk(D
′
2) = k} .
Since [n]\E is an information set of C by definition, the matrix
D′2 is of full rank if and only if the matrix D contains a basis
of the code C. Let Gs be a generator matrix of the code C,
then there is an U ∈ Fn×kqs such that
U ·Gs = D .
The codewords in D are chosen uniformly at random, which is
equivalent to U ∼ unif(Fn×kqs ). Since the generator matrix Gs
is full-rank by definition, the multiplication is rank preserving.
Hence, it holds that rk(D) = k, i.e., the matrix D contains a
basis of C, if and only if rk(U) = k, which is well-known to
be
Pr{rk(D′2) = k} = Pr{rk(U) = k} =
n∏
j=n−k+1
1−
1
qsj
.
Now consider the bottom part of the matrix. From (3) we get
0n−k×n = B2 ·
(
D1,1 D1,2
D2,1 D2,2
)
= B2 ·
((
U1
U2
)
·Gs
)
⇒ B2 ·
(
U1
U2
)
= 0n−k×k .
Since rk(U) = k and rk(B) = n by assumption, it follows
that B2 is a basis of the dual space of U . As U is chosen
uniformly at random, every full rank U is equally likely and
therefore also any B2. From (3) we further get
Eˆ′2 = B2 ·
(
Eˆ1
Eˆ2
)
= B2 · Eˆ ,
where B2 ∈ Fqs and Eˆ1, Eˆ2 ∈ Fq . Let M ∼ unif(F
n−k×n
qs ).
TABLE I
PARAMETER CHOICES AND THE WORK FACTORS OF THE ATTACKS
PRESENTED IN SECTION V-A AND V-B. THE RATE R IS OBTAINED BY
COROLLARY 1.
q s v n k δ R V-A V-B
16 32 31 100 50 50
1
64
2
124
2
128
16 32 16 100 50 800
1
4
2
64
2
128
32 32 31 100 50 50
1
64
2
155
2
160
32 32 26 100 50 50
3
32
2
130
2
160
32 32 24 100 50 400
1
8
2
160
2
120
64 32 21 100 50 550
11
64
2
192
2
126
We are interested in the probability
Pr{rk(B2 · Eˆ) = n− k| rk(D
′
2) = k}
= Pr{rk(B2 · Eˆ) = n− k| rk(U) = k}
(a)
= Pr{rk(B2 · Eˆ) = n− k}
= Pr{rk(M · Eˆ) = n− k| rk(M) = n− k}
=
Pr{rk(M · Eˆ) = n− k ∧ rk(M) = n− k}
Pr{rk(M) = n− k}
≥ Pr{rk(M · Eˆ) = n− k ∧ rk(M) = n− k}
= 1− Pr{rk(M · Eˆ) < n− k ∨ rk(M) < n− k}
≥ 1− (Pr{rk(M · Eˆ) < n− k}+ Pr{rk(M) < n− k})
= 1−(1−Pr{rk(M ·Eˆ)=n− k})−Pr{rk(M)<n− k})
= Pr{rk(M · Eˆ) = n− k} − Pr{rk(M) < n− k} ,
where (a) holds because Eˆ is independent of U and B2 is
uniformly distributed if U is uniformly distributed over all full
rank matrices. To obtain the first probability, we fix a basis
of Fqs over Fq and consider the extension of M ∈ F
n−k×n
qs
to M¯ ∈ F
s(n−k)×n
q obtained by representing every element in
this basis. AsM is random over Fqs , the matrix M¯ is random
over Fq. The multiplication of two random matrices is again
a random matrix, hence we get M¯ · Eˆ ∼ unif(F
s(n−k)×n−k
q )
and equivalently, when mapping back to Fqs , we get M · Eˆ ∼
F
n−k×n−k
qs . Hence
Pr{rk(M · Eˆ) = n− k} =
n−k∏
j=1
1−
1
qsj
.
It follows that
Pr{rk(B2 · Eˆ) = n− k}
≥
n−k∏
j=1
(
1−
1
qsj
)
−
1− n∏
j=k+1
(
1−
1
qsj
)
and the theorem statement follows.
VI. PARAMETER CHOICES
Table I shows the achieved PIR rate for different choices
of parameters together with lower bounds on the complexity
of the respective attacks, as derived in Section V-A and V-B.
Note that rate of the presented scheme depends greatly on the
chosen parameters. Increasing q and/or s increases the security
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Fig. 3. Attack complexities for different values of v with q = 32, s = 32,
n = 100, and k = 50.
and therefore allows for increasing the rate of the scheme by
adapting v and/or k. However, increasing the values of q or
s increases the complexity of the scheme, as the server is
required to perform multiplications over the respective fields.
As the computational complexity is regarded as the bottleneck
for computational PIR [11], we present parameters resulting
in a low rate, but relatively good complexity. Due to a lack of
space a detailed comparison of the complexity compared to the
existing schemes of [12], [15] is left as future work. Instead
we provide some intuition on why the scheme can perform
favorably compared to these schemes in terms of complexity.
Although the field size resulting from the parameters given
in Table I appear to be large from a coding-theoretic point
of view, the majority of the more complex operations, i.e.,
multiplications, is not over these fields, but instead between
elements of the field and elements of a subfield. Especially,
since the files are only from Fq , all multiplications performed
on the server side, the number of which depends on the
(generally large) number of files and their size, are of the
form αβ with α ∈ Fqs and β ∈ Fq . Each element α ∈ Fqs
can be represented as a polynomial of degree s− 1 over Fq ,
so the complexity of this multiplication is just the complexity
of multiplying the s coefficients of this polynomial by β.
Assuming a complexity of (log(q))2 for the multiplication
of elements from a field Fq, this gives a complexity of
s(log(q))2 = (log(q
√
s))2, which is equivalent to performing
multiplications over a field Fq
√
s . For example, for q = 32 and
s = 32 this is approximately equivalent to the complexity of
multiplications over F229 . As a comparison, the parameters
proposed in [12, Section IV] require the multiplication of
matrices of similar size to our scheme on the server side, but
over the integer field F260+325. This is not only significantly
larger than the "equivalent field" in our construction, but
additionally does not provide the hardware advantages that
extension fields of F2 provide, namely the possibility of
implementation based on shifts and XORs.
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